The intensifying rivalry between the United States and China is fragmenting the global system along economic and institutional lines. This seminar argues that states’ compliance with their international obligations is influenced by the degree to which the global system is consolidated under a single institutional order governing international trade, finance, and capital flows. The structure of the international system—whether consolidated or fragmented—matters because it amplifies or diminishes the force of the compliance mechanisms that encourage states to obey international law. As the global system grows more divided, these mechanisms will weaken, leading to an increasing breakdown in international legal order.
Four compliance mechanisms are examined: (1) reputational costs, (2) reciprocity, (3) retaliation, and (4) outcasting. These mechanisms, which feature prominently in the rationalist account of why states obey international law, operate most effectively in a consolidated system with a single dominant institutional framework. In such systems, states lack alternative networks for international cooperation, and this increases the pressure on states to comply with their obligations. In contrast, a fragmented order reduces compliance pressure because states can pivot to other networks of trade, finance, and economic cooperation and so states feel less bound by their international obligations. While the rationalist approach to compliance is well-established, the effect of global fragmentation on state compliance with international law has been undertheorized. This seminar addresses this gap by offering a theoretical framework for predicting when states are less likely to obey international law.

About the Speaker:

Prof. Bryan Druzin, Associate Professor, CUHK LAW.

Register here by 12 noon (HKT), 8 April 2025 to attend the seminar.