English courts have taken two conflicting approaches to fair hearings. One line of cases says fairness or justice requires a hearing only when it stands to contribute to a more accurate overall decision. Another line of cases says that fairness requires a hearing independently of its contribution to an overall decision. Recently, many commentators have championed the second approach, usually based on an appeal to non-instrumental process values, such as respect and autonomy. By contrast, Prof. Adam Perry and Mr. Angelo Ryu favour the first, accuracy-centred approach. In this article, they offer a precise interpretation of that approach and a novel argument in its support. The Accuracy First principle they defend states that fairness does not demand an administrative hearing (or hearing of a certain form) unless there is a real chance that it will improve the accuracy of an authority’s decision. Previous arguments for similar principles have tended to deny that there are process values. Their argumentative strategy is different: they show that the Accuracy First principle is consistent with the existence and importance of process values.